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I. INTRODUCTION

A basic rule of legal ethics, since at least 1836, requires lawyers to

communicate only with an adverse party's lawyer, rather than directly with
the represented party. 112 Criminal defense attorneys and federal
prosecutors however, have long disagreed on the actual scope of this
ethical rule in the criminal law context. For years, both sides have debated
whether this "no-contact" rule extends
protection to represented persons
1 13
prior to their indictment or arrest.
As states extended their "no-contact" prohibition to pre-indictment,

non-custodial criminal investigations, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
responded by promulgating its own ethical rule. 114 The DOJ rule limited
the scope of its "no-contact" prohibition to represented parties who have

already been indicted or arrested, and are no longer mere targets of a
criminal investigation.
In response to the DOJ rule, the 1 0 5 th Congress passed what is
popularly known as the McDade Amendment. 115 The McDade

Amendment, named after its chief sponsor Representative Joseph McDade
(R-PA), was included in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
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Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999. The bill was signed into law on
October 21, 1998.
The McDade Amendment required federal prosecutors to fully comply
with state bar ethics rules by April 19, 1999. Prior to the McDade
Amendment, the DOJ contended that their communications with
represented individuals were governed by their own rule. Following the
McDade Amendment's implementation however, federal prosecutors
practicing in Virginia will be governed by the Virginia State Bar ethics
rules. This paper examines the effects of the McDade Amendment on
federal prosecutors practicing in Virginia, with a specific focus on the
impact of Virginia's "no-contact" rule.
The first section of this paper analyzes the ethics rule promulgated by
the Department of Justice. The DOJ rule governs those circumstances in
which federal prosecutors may communicate with individuals known to be
represented by counsel, without the consent of such counsel.
The second and third sections of this paper discuss the judicial and
statutory rejection of the DOJ rule respectively. First, in O'Keefe v.
McDonnell Douglas," 6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the DOJ lacked authority to promulgate their ethics rule. As
a result of this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit held the DOJ rule invalid.
Congress then statutorily rejected the DOJ rule through the McDade
Amendment.
The final section of this paper discusses the impact of the McDade
Amendment on federal prosecutors practicing in Virginia. Specifically,
this section examines Virginia's ethics rule regarding contact with
represented individuals. This analysis will cover both Virginia's current
Code of Professional Responsibility, and Virginia's proposed Rules of
Professional Conduct, expected to take effect in January 2000.
As of January 2000, when Virginia's proposed "no-contact" rule takes
effect, the McDade Amendment will have minimal impact on the
communications of federal prosecutors practicing in Virginia. As a result
of collaborative efforts between the criminal defense bar and prosecutors,
Virginia entered the unique position of resolving the conflict over the
actual scope of the "no-contact" rule. The final sections of this paper
analyze this compromise and what it means to federal prosecutors
practicing in Virginia.
II. PROMULGATION OF THE DOJ "No-CONTACT" RULE
A. ABA and State "No-Contact" Rules
116

132 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1998).

Rules of professional conduct governing attorneys generally require
lawyers for one party in a dispute to communicate only through an
adverse party's lawyer, and prohibit communications directly with the
party. 1 7 Both the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct follow this general "nocontact" approach. DR 7-104(A)(1) of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
A. During the course of his representation of a client a
lawyer shall not:
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on the
subject of the representation with a party he knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the
prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or
is authorized by law to do so.118
Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
119
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
In the criminal law context, the official ABA comments to Model Rule
4.2 explain that this "no-contact" rule extends protection beyond that
provided by the United States Constitution. 120 For example, although the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after a person has been
officially charged in an adversarial proceeding, 12 1 the "no-contact" rule
should be applicable prior to any such adversarial proceedings.
With the passage of time, the full scope of the "no-contact" rule in the
criminal law context grew increasingly uncertain. Although many federal
courts of appeal held that "no-contact" rules did not apply in preindictment and non-custodial situations,122 state courts and state bars
varied widely in defining the full scope of the "no-contact" rule. 123 The
resulting uncertainty grew particularly troubling as federal prosecutors
were encouraged by the DOJ to play a larger role in pre-indictment and
24
pre-arrest
investigations.1
criminal
included covert
contacts with Such
a criminal
suspectinvestigations
by undercover frequently
agents or
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informants, at the direction of a federal prosecutor. 125 Finally, as state
courts and state bars expanded the scope of the "no-contact" rule to these
pre-indictment and pre-arrest situations, the DOJ was prompted to seek
federal preemption from the state ethics rules.
B. Thornburgh Memorandum
On June 8, 1989, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh distributed a
policy memorandum to all DOJ litigators regarding communications with
individuals represented by counsel. 126 Known as the Thornburgh
Memorandum, it concluded that federal prosecutors were not governed by
state bar ethics rules, particularly the "no-contact" rule. 127 A decision of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in, United States
v.
129
Hammad,12 8 was a direct cause for the Thornburgh Memorandum.

In Hammad, an informant volunteered to obtain incriminating
statements from an uncharged suspect of a federal investigation. The
informant was given a phony subpoena to ease the procurement of
evidence to present to the grand jury against the suspect. When
subsequently challenged in court, the federal prosecutor offered no
evidence to rebut the conclusion that he knew the suspect was represented
by counsel when he gave the informant the phony subpoena. 3 ° In its
initial opinion, on May 12, 1988, the Hammad court held that the "nocontact" rule applied to federal criminal investigations both before and
after indictment, and that using an informant to gather information from a
represented suspect was a violation of the rule.131
The original Hammad decision has been referred to as the "high-water
mark" of the defense bar's litigative effort to limit otherwise appropriate
federal investigative techniques. 132 In his memorandum, Attorney General
Thornburgh accused defense counsel of using DR 4-107 and Model Rule
4.2 to achieve through the ethics rules what could not be achieved through
the Constitution: a right to counsel at the investigative stage of criminal
proceedings.133 Thornburgh also noted, following publication of his
memorandum, that state "no-contact" rules had become a defense weapon
used to "threaten disciplinary action against a federal prosecutor for using
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confidential informants, seeking wiretap authorizations, or interviewing
34
low-level functionaries to obtain evidence against principals."1
Subsequently, the Second Circuit revised its original holding in
Hammad. The second Hammad decision expressed concern that the
original opinion might unduly hamper criminal investigations, particularly
in those cases in which career criminals have attempted to immunize
themselves by hiring "house counsel.' 35 The revised opinion still applied
the "no-contact" rule to federal criminal investigations, but concluded that
the use of informants to gather evidence against a suspect will frequently
fall within the "authorized by law" exception to the rule. 136 Even after
consideration of the revised opinion however, the Hammad decision still
was seen as "exacerbat[ing] the uncertainty felt by many
government
137
attorneys over what is appropriate conduct in this area."
In order to define DOJ policy in this area, the Thornburgh
Memorandum concluded that a DOJ attorney's communication with
individuals represented by counsel, either overtly or in an undercover
context, will not violate state "no-contact" rules. 138 This conclusion was
based on the Supremacy Clause which "forbids the states from regulating
the attorneys' conduct in a manner inconsistent with their federal
responsibilities, as determined by federal law and the Attorney
General.' 39 Thornburgh explained that the "federal interest in protecting
federal officials
in the performance of their federal duties is
40
paramount."

Although Thornburgh also stated his intention to codify his policy of
federal preemption of state "no-contact" rules, there was no such
codification during the Bush Administration. However, in 1994, Attorney
General Janet Reno promulgated rules governing such communications
with represented individuals.
C.

Promulgation of DOJ Rules
The final rule, promulgated by the DOJ in 1994, outlined the situations
in which federal prosecutors may communicate with represented
individuals during the course of law enforcement investigations and
proceedings. 14 1 The final rule generally prohibited contacts with
"represented parties" without the prior consent of counsel, with certain
134
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limited and enumerated exceptions. 142 Alternatively, the final rule
generally permitted investigative contacts with "represented persons,"
unless the contact was for the purpose of negotiating
plea agreements,
43
arrangements.
legal
similar
other
or
settlement,
The following analyzes the "represented party"- "represented person"
distinction created by the final rule.
1. "Represented Party" vs. "Represented Person"
The final rule differentiates between a "represented party" and a
"represented person."' 144 An individual is considered to be a "represented
party" if:
(1) the person is represented by counsel;
(2) the representation is current and concerns the subject
matter in question; and
(3) the person has either been arrested or charged in a
federal criminal case or is a defendant in a civil law
enforcement proceeding
concerning the subject matter of
45
the representation.

Alternatively, if the individual is represented by counsel on the subject
matter in question, but has not been arrested or charged, that individual is
considered a "represented person."' 146 In other words, an individual is
considered a "represented person," rather than a "represented party," if
paragraphs (1) and (2) above apply, but the circumstance in paragraph (3)
above does not exist. Thus, suspects and targets of criminal investigations
who have not been indicted or arrested, but are represented
in the subject
147
matter at issue, are considered "represented persons."'
2. General Prohibition from Contacting "Represented Parties"
A federal prosecutor is prohibited from communicating, or causing
another to communicate, with a "represented party" about the subject
48
matter of the representation without the consent of that party's attorney. 1
This general prohibition applies only if the prosecutor knows that the
"represented party" is, in fact, represented by counsel.
3. Permitted Contacts with "Represented Parties"
The final rule enumerates a number of limited circumstances where a
federal prosecutor may communicate with a "represented party" without
first obtaining consent of that party's counsel. These enumerated
14259 Fed. Reg. at 39910.
143Id.
14428 C.F.R. § 77.3 (1998).
145
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circumstances serve as exceptions to the general no-contact rule for
"represented parties," and include the following areas: determination if
15
representation exists; 149 discovery or judicial or administrative process; 0
initiation of communication by the "represented party;"'15 1 waivers at the
time of arrest; 152 investigation of154additional, different, or ongoing
crimes; 153 and threat to safety or life.
4. General Authorization for Communications with "Represented
Persons"
The general prohibition against communicating with "represented
parties" does not apply to individuals and organizations who are neither
defendants nor arrestees. 155 Therefore, federal prosecutors are generally

authorized

to communicate,

either

directly or indirectly,

with a

"represented person" during the process of a criminal investigation. 156

5. Plea Negotiations and Other Legal Agreements
While negotiating a legal agreement, a federal prosecutor
prohibited from communicating with either "represented
"represented persons" without the consent of counsel. 157
agreements include: plea agreements, settlements,
immunity
1 58
or any other disposition of a claim or charge.

is generally
parties" or
Such legal
agreements,

6. Respect for Attorney-Client Relationships

14928 C.F.R. § 77.6(a). In promulgating the final rule, the DOJ explained that there was
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Although a communication may otherwise be permitted under the final
rule, the communication will nevertheless be prohibited if it seeks to
disrupt the attorney-client relationship. Examples of such disruption
include: (a) attempts to elicit information regarding lawful defense
strategies, or (b) disparaging the "represented party's" or "represented
person's" counsel. 159 This prohibition applies to every phase of criminal
investigations and proceedings, and does not
differentiate between a
"represented party" and "represented person."160
7. Organizations and Employees
When an organization is a "represented party," a federal prosecutor
may not communicate with any controlling individual of that organization
without the consent of the organization's attorney, subject to the
aforementioned "represented party" exceptions. 16 1 However, if the
organization merely qualifies as a "represented person," a federal
prosecutor may communicate with any controlling individual. 162 A
"controlling individual," as referred to above, refers to individuals who are
a part of the organization's control group. The "controlling individual"
must hold a high-level position within the organization and participate as a
decision-maker. 16 3 Former employees are not considered "controlling
individuals;" therefore, communications with 164
former employees of
represented organizations are generally permitted.
If any current or former member of an organization retains his or her
own personal counsel, that individual receives individualized protection
under the DOJ rule. 165 The scope of any such individualized protection
however, is dependent on whether that 66individual is considered a
"represented party" or "represented person." 1
8. Relationship to State and Local Regulations
The DOJ intended its final rule to constitute communications
"authorized by law" within the meaning of DR 7-104 and Model Rule
4.2.167 Therefore, the DOJ did not expect the final rule to create tension
with state and local rules. 16 8 However, if the communications permitted
under the DOJ rule are viewed as inconsistent with state or local rules, the
DOJ rule also preempts and supersedes the entire field of any such
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inconsistent rules. 169 Preemption of inconsistent state and local rules was
deemed necessary in order to ensure uniform
regulation and predictable
170
standards for federal criminal investigations.
III. JUDICIAL REJECTION OF DOJ RULE
In 1998, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
invalidated the DOJ rule. The case, O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas
Corporation,17 1 was an appeal by the federal government from a
protective order preventing it from communicating with current
employees of the defendant,
McDonnell Douglas, without consent of the
72
corporation's counsel. 1
The action against McDonnell Douglas arose under the False Claims
Act, "alleging mischarging of labor hours by employees of McDonnell
Douglas Corporation . . . while working on United States military
contracts. 1 7 3 While the lawsuit was pending, DOJ attorneys conducted a
pretrial investigation. "In particular, investigative agents of the DOJ began
making ex parte contacts with various present and former lower-level
employees of McDonnell Douglas without the consent of McDonnell
Douglas's counsel."' 17 4 The communication at issue involved a
questionnaire asking "whether the [low-level] employee ever
engaged in
75
mischarging of labor, and, if so, at the direction of whom." 1
Thereafter, McDonnell Douglas moved for a protective order
preventing such DOJ communications, "arguing that they were barred by
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4-4.2. ''176 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri, in which the lawsuit was pending,
also adopted this rule. 177 Rule 4-4.2 provides:
[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
17 8
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
"The official comment explains that where the opposing party is a
organization, Rule 4-4.2 bars ex parte communications with 'persons
169 28 C.F.R. § 77.12.
170
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having managerial responsibility..., and with any other person whose act
or omission. . . may be imputed on the organization. . ., or whose
1 79
statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization."'
8
The protective order was granted notwithstanding DOJ objections. 0
The government argued that the protective order was unwarranted because
the communications were "authorized by law," an exception to Missouri's
general "no-contact" rule. 18 1 The government argued this authorization
resulted from the DOJ rule governing communications with "represented
parties" and "represented persons." 182 In particular, as long as the current
employee was not considered a "controlling individual" of McDonnell
Douglas, the federal government could communicate with the current
1 83
employee without the consent of the corporation's counsel.

In the district court's opinion granting the protective order requested
by McDonnell Douglas, it concluded that the DOJ lacked authorization to
issue its rule exempting federal attorneys from the "no-contact"
requirements of state ethical rules.' 8 4 Additionally, with reference to the
specific issue before the court, the district court held that promulgation of
the DOJ rule dealing with "organizations and employees" was beyond the
limits of the Attorney General's statutory authority.18 5 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the DOJ rule was
invalid, thereby rejecting the government's "authorized by law"
86
argument.'
IV.

STATUTORY REJECTION OF THE

DOJ RULE

As part of the Omnibus Appropriations Bill of 1998, Congress passed
a provision subjecting federal prosecutors to state and local rules of
professional responsibility. 187 The pertinent language states:
[a]n attorney for the Government shall be subject to State
laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing
attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that
179
180
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attorney's duties, to the same extent
and in the same manner
1 88
State.
that
in
attorneys
as other
This provision, named after its chief sponsor Representative Joseph
McDade (R-PA), negates the DOJ rule which attempted to exempt federal
prosecutors from state "no-contact" rules. 189 The McDade Amendment
passed the House of Representatives with strong support from both
political parties, including current Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL),
Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX), House Judiciary Committee
Chairman Henry Hyde (R-IL), Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (DMO) and Minority Whip David Bonior (D-MI). 190 It also received support
from the American Bar Association, the American Corporate Counsel
Association,
and the National Association of Criminal Defense
19 1
Lawyers.

During the legislative deliberations, the DOJ vigorously fought the
McDade Amendment. 192 In support of its position, the DOJ set forth
specific instances in which compliance with state laws or rules posed
problems for federal law enforcement efforts. These specific instances
include:
(1) the conduct of undercover investigations involving
persons represented by counsel;
(2) contacts with persons represented on one matter
concerning additional, different or ongoing new offenses;
(3) situations where a represented person has initiated
contact with law enforcement agents, and seeks to
cooperate without informing his current counsel; and
(4) state rules requiring prosecutors to honor a blanket
claim by corporate counsel that he or 93
she represents both
the corporation and all employees .... 1
As a result of legislative wrangling between proponents and opponents
of the McDade Amendment, the effective date of the provision was
delayed for six months, until April 19, 1999.194 Theoretically, this delay

188 Id. § 801(a).
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1999).
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192 Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to all United States Attorneys on the
McDade Provision (1998).
193 Memorandum from the Executive Office of United States Attorneys to All United
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194 Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno, supra note 81.

195
was to allow the DOJ to amend its rules to comply with the new law.
However, during the six month delay, in addition to preparing for
implementation of the new law, 1the
DOJ continued efforts to repeal or
96
modify the McDade Amendment.

On January 19, 1999, in support of DOJ lobbying efforts, Senate
Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT) introduced legislation to overturn
the McDade Amendment. 197 If enacted, Hatch's bill would expressly
exempt federal prosecutors from complying with state ethics rules that
interfere with federal law enforcement. 98 The measure also specifies
categories of punishable conduct for employees of DOJ, sets out penalties
ranging from reprimand to dismissal, and creates a commission of federal
judges to study the subject of federal prosecutorial conduct. 199 In a
statement accompanying his bill, Senator Hatch also suggested
"perhaps it
200
is time to consider the development of federal rules of ethics."
On March 24, 1999, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice Oversight held a hearing on the Hatch bill.20 ' Witnesses testifying
in support of the Hatch bill included the Deputy Attorney General and
United States Attorneys from New York and Florida. Subcommittee
Chairman Strom Thurmond commenced the hearing with a statement
supporting repeal of the McDade Amendment. Thurmond mostly
expressed concern over the state "no-contact" rules which effectively
prohibit certain undercover investigations and sting operations. An
additional concern of Thurmond's involved state rules which restrict the
ability of authorities to speak with low-level company
employees who
20 2
wrongdoing.
corporate
expose
to
voluntarily wish
With the exception of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee's hearing,
the Hatch bill received no further legislative action prior to the April 19
deadline. Additionally,
no comparable bill was introduced in the House of
20 3
Representatives.
Witnessing little movement on his bill to repeal the McDade
Amendment, on March 25, 1999, Hatch introduced a bill postponing the
195Press Release from National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note

79.
196

Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno, supra note 81.

197 S.

250, 106th Cong. (1999).

198 Senate Bill Seeks to Preempt, Revamp New Law on Federal Prosecutors' Ethics,
supra note 80.
199 Id.
20 0

Id. at 338.

201 The Effect of State Ethics Rules on FederalLaw Enforcement, 1999: Hearings on S.

250 Before the Senate Subcomm. on CriminalJustice Oversight, 106th Cong. (1999).
202Id. (statement of Senator Strom Thurmond, Subcomm. Chairman).
203 Senate Bill Seeks to Preempt, Revamp New Law on Federal Prosecutors' Ethics,
supra note 80.

McDade Amendment's effective date for an additional six months. 20 4 A bipartisan group of senators co-sponsored the bill. Hatch's postponement bill
was not referred to any committee;
instead, it was referred directly to and
20 5
Senate.
full
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V.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MCDADE AMENDMENT IN VIRGINIA

As a consequence of the McDade Amendment, federal prosecutors
practicing in Virginia may soon be governed by Virginia State Bar ethics
rules. The following analyzes Virginia's rule on communications with
represented individuals, and considers the impact of applying Virginia's
rule to federal prosecutors.
As of the McDade Amendment's original effective date, Virginia's
ethical rules mirrored the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has formally
approved new ethical rules paralleling the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Virginia's new legal ethics rules will take effect in
January 2000. Since the Virginia State Bar's transfer from the ethics code
to the new ethics rules takes place approximately eight months after the
McDade Amendment's original effective date, both the Virginia code and
rules may govern federal prosecutors practicing in Virginia at different
times.
A. Virginia State Bar Code of Professional Responsibility
Unless Congress modifies or repeals the McDade Amendment,
Virginia's ethical code will govern federal prosecutors practicing in
Virginia through 1999. Virginia's current "no-contact" rule, DR 7103(A)(1), creates a blanket prohibition against contacting a represented
individual without the consent of counsel. Virginia's "no-contact"
disciplinary rule mirrors the ABA Model Code provision, and states:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the
subject of the representation with a party he knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the
prior written consent of the lawyer representing such other
party or is authorized by law to do so. o6
Though the specific language of Virginia's DR 7-103(A)(1) prohibits
ex parte communications with a represented "party," this blanket
204 S. 755, 106th Cong. (1999).
205 Senate Bill Seeks Second Postponement of Statute

on FederalProsecutors' Ethics,

CRiM. L. REP., Apr. 6, 1999, at 2581; Interview with Staff of Senate Judiciary Committee

(Apr. 16, 1999).
206 Va. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(A)(1) (1997).

prohibition has been extended to persons who are not yet parties in the
criminal context. 20 7 Specifically, prosecutors may not communicate with a
represented,
uncharged suspect without consent of the uncharged suspect's
08
lawyer.

2

The Virginia State Bar's extension of "no-contact" protection to
uncharged criminal suspects, breaks down the careful distinction between
a "represented party" and a "represented person" created by the DOJ rule.
Under the DOJ rule, federal prosecutors are generally prohibited from
communicating with "represented parties", but are generally permitted to
make contact with "represented persons." 20 9 Under the Virginia
disciplinary rule, in effect through 1999, communications are prohibited in
both situations. Based on the Virginia State Bar's broad interpretation of
"party" in DR 7-104(A)(1), federal prosecutors will be prohibited from
communicating, directly or indirectly, with both "represented parties" and
"represented persons."
Additionally, in the context of organizations in Virginia, current
employees of a corporate adversary may not be contacted if they are in the
corporation's "control group."210 Although reference to "control group"
may parallel the DOJ's rule concerning "controlling individual," the
Virginia rule covers a much broader class of people. Virginia's "control
group" covers current employees who may speak for the corporation or
bind it by his or her acts or omissions, even though the same employee
may not hold a high-level position or be a decision-maker. 21' The DOJ
rule meanwhile limits protection to current, high-level2 12employees who
participate as actual decision-makers in the organization.
It should be recalled that the O'Keefe case, referenced earlier for its
invalidation of the DOJ rule, found that the federal government's attorney
violated a local ethics rule which mirrored Virginia's rule on
communications with current employees. 213 Although the employees
contacted in O'Keefe were low-level and non-controlling individuals, after
reviewing the substantive law under which the corporation was charged,
the court determined that the employees' acts or omissions could be
imputed to the corporate defendant. Apparently, while the DOJ rule relies
largely upon the current employees' position in the corporation, the ethical
rules in O'Keefe and Virginia rely on something very different.
Application of the "no-contact" rules in O'Keefe and Virginia ultimately
207 VA. CODE ANN., Legal Ethics Op. 1670 (Apr. 1, 1996).
208
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rely upon a determination of whether the substantive law, 2 14 under which
an organization is charged, makes the corporation liable for the acts or
omissions of the current employees.
B. Virginia's Rules of Professional Conduct
1. The Virginia and ABA Rule 4.2 Compared
In January 2000, the Virginia rules of professional conduct will
officially take effect. As for communications with individuals represented
by counsel, Virginia borrowed the language of its ethics rule directly from
ABA Model Rule 4.2. The Virginia and ABA Rule 4.2 generally prohibit
communications with represented persons, stating:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate
about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent
of the other
2 15
so.
do
to
law
by
lawyer or is authorized
Although the actual language of Virginia Rule 4.2 is identical to ABA
Model Rule 4.2, there are critical differences in the language of their
official comments. Of particular importance are the differences in
Comment 2, which deals with criminal investigations.
Comment 2, of ABA Model Rule 4.2, attempts to explain when
criminal investigative contacts will be "authorized by law," an exception
to the Rule.216 ABA Comment 2 states:
Communications authorized by law also include
constitutionally
permissible
activities
of lawyers
representing government entities, directly or through
investigative agents, prior to the commencement of
criminal or law enforcement proceedings, when there is
applicable judicial precedent that either has found the
activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule
inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical
restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional
provisions. 217
In Virginia, the official comments to ABA Model Rule 4.2 were
rejected. 218 Having rejected the ABA comments, Virginia Rule 4.2,
Comment 2, states:

214
215
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In circumstances where applicable judicial precedent has
approved investigative contacts in pre-indictment, noncustodial circumstances, and they are not prohibited by any
provision of the United States Constitution or Virginia
Constitution, they should be considered to be authorized by
law within the meaning of the Rule. Similarly,
communications in civil matters may be considered
authorized2 19
by law if they have been approved by judicial
precedent.

Conspicuously absent from Comment 2 of Virginia Rule 4.2 is
language imposing "ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by
constitutional provisions." The rejection of such language found in ABA
Model Rule 4.2, Comment 2, suggests Virginia wanted to avoid this ABA
commentary on Rule 4.2. 220 In particular, the ABA has extended its "nocontact" prohibition to "represented persons" prior to their indictment or
arrest; thereby, extending protection beyond the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 22 '
Additionally, ABA Model Rule 4.2, Comment 2 explains that
communications are authorized by law when there is "applicable judicial
precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or
has found this Rule inapplicable." 222 The ABA Comment therefore,
suggests that judicial precedent is "applicable" when a court has reviewed
the communication at issue as against the actual rule. It would seem to
follow then, that if courts have not spoken on the actual rule, there can be
no "applicable judicial precedent."
Unlike ABA Comment 2, Virginia Rule 4.2, Comment 2, does not link
"applicable judicial precedent" to case law on the rule itself. Ironically, if
the language of ABA Comment 2 had been adopted in Virginia,
"applicable judicial precedent" could not exist until after Rule 4.2 took
effect in January 2000. And even then, it begs the question of how to get
the first case saying a communication already had been approved.
2. The Virginia Rule 4.2 Explained
The final language of Virginia Rule 4.2, and its correlative comments,
was drafted by a subcommittee of the Special Committee to Study the
Code of Professional Responsibility. This subcommittee included Dennis
Dohnal - chairman of the full committee, Helen Fahey - United States
2 19
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Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Bill Petty - Commonwealth's
Attorney for Lynchburg, and Craig Cooley - criminal defense attorney.
The final language for Rule 4.2, Comment 2 however, resulted largely
from the efforts3 of Chairman Dennis Dohnal and United States Attorney
22
Helen Fahey.
Originally, Fahey declined to participate in the drafting process. Her
participation was conditioned on sufficiently massaging the language of
Rule 4.2 to permit communications with "represented persons" who are
merely targets of a criminal investigation. Chairman Dohnal, intent on the
United States Attorney's involvement in drafting the Virginia rule, agreed
to work with Fahey to craft agreeable "wiggle room" into Rule 4.2.224
Together, Dohnal and Fahey, crafted language which set Virginia Rule 4.2
apart from her sister states and the ABA.
Comment 2 explains that investigative contacts in pre-indictment and
non-custodial situations are "authorized by law" and not prohibited by
Rule 4.2 when: (1) "applicable judicial precedent" has approved of such
contacts, and (2) they are not prohibited by any provision of the United
States Constitution or the Virginia Constitution. As explained by
Chairman Dohnal, Comment 2 ultimately gives prosecutors an "ethical
out" from the constraints of Rule 4.2 during the investigation of criminal
suspects.22 5
Communications with represented criminal suspects in Virginia will be
permitted so long as approved by "applicable judicial precedent" and not
violative of the United States or Virginia Constitutions. 226 "Applicable
judicial precedent" incorporates case law on the books, including case law
involving the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.22 7 Sixth Amendment
case law generally permits communications, both direct and indirect, with
"represented persons" without the consent of counsel prior to the
commencement of formal charges.22 8 Therefore, unless otherwise
prohibited by the United States or Virginia Constitutions, prosecutors
generally will be permitted to communicate with "represented persons"
prior to indictment or arrest. 229 However, once a criminal suspect is
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formally
charged,
Sixth Amendment
protections
attach and
communications with the "represented party" generally will be prohibited.
By incorporating Sixth Amendment case law through Comment 2,
Virginia Rule 4.2 basically parallels the DOJ rule and its "represented
party" "represented person" distinction. The Virginia Rule also avoids
Attorney General Thornburgh's fear, referenced above: the creation
of a
230
proceedings.
criminal
of
stage
investigative
the
at
right to counsel
Communications with targets of criminal investigations also are
referenced in Comment 5a of Virginia Rule 4.2. Comment 5a however,
simply expresses concern about protecting the attorney-client relationship
2 1
where the target of the criminal investigation is represented by counsel.
Protection of the attorney-client relationship in all stages
of a criminal
232
rule.
DOJ
the
of
concern
express
an
investigation also was
In the case of an organization, Virginia Rule 4.2, Comment 4, mirrors
the Virginia
State Bar's interpretation
of DR 7-103(A)(1).
Communications with current employees of a corporation will be
prohibited where the employee is a member of the corporation's "control
group," which includes current employees who have the authority to bind
the corporation. 233 Unlike the DOJ rule, Virginia Rule 4.2 concerns itself
not only with the current employee's position in the organization, but also
with the authority of the current employee to bind the organization.
VI. CONCLUSION

In promulgating Rule 4.2 and its correlative comments, particularly
Comment 2, Virginia has been described as a "renegade." 234 However,
Rule 4.2 was crafted with the intention of bringing federal prosecutors
back into the fold of state bar ethical control. Chairman Dohnal ultimately
hoped federal prosecutors practicing in Virginia would abide by Virginia's
2 35
ethical rules and not fight implementation of the McDade Amendment.
Within the context of communications with represented individuals,
implementation of the McDade Amendment will have little effect on
federal prosecutors practicing in Virginia as of January 2000. When
Virginia Rule 4.2 takes effect, investigative communications with
represented individuals in Virginia largely will be governed by case law,
particularly that involving the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Such
case law largely dictated the DOJ ethics rule. As a result, Virginia's
230 See supra note 22.
231
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federal prosecutors will continue to be generally prohibited from
communicating with "represented parties" and permitted to communicate
with "represented persons," as those terms were defined in the DOJ rule.
Virginia Rule 4.2 is not completely devoid of negative consequences
for federal prosecutors however. When organizations are involved, the
Virginia rule restricts the ability of federal prosecutors to speak with lowlevel employees. The DOJ rule meanwhile, only restricted federal
prosecutors from speaking with high-level, decision-making employees.
Virginia's more expansive restriction on such communications will only
attach at the time the organization is formally charged, in accordance with
Comment 2. Prior to formal charges being filed, prosecutors generally
may communicate with any current employee of the organization.
As a result of the collaborative efforts between criminal defense
attorneys and prosecutors, Virginia may have silenced the ongoing debate
over the scope of the "no-contact" rule. Prosecutors will be permitted to
communicate with represented persons who are targets of criminal
investigations; however, they may not communicate with low-level
employees of an indicted organization who have the authority to bind their
organization. The compromise reached between criminal defense
attorneys and prosecutors, in drafting Virginia Rule 4.2 and its correlative
comments, illustrates the benefits of active involvement within state bar
associations. Such active involvement may be a positive, yet unintended,
consequence of the McDade Amendment.

